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The Rise of Russia and the National 
Security Implications for the  
United States 
Matthew Saha*
ABSTRACT 
How the United States approaches its relationship with Russia must be 
an important consideration when devising the U.S.’s national security 
strategy.  The security implications for the U.S. are profound because 
Russia’s role in the ever-growing global environment reaches many different 
countries and regions of the world.  This paper aims to review the U.S.’s 
relationship with Russia, past and present, while recognizing how Russia’s 
leadership, military, economic, and energy policies will play key roles in 
that association.  Additionally, this paper will focus on the options, 
challenges, and threats that are present in the U.S.’s relationship with Russia, 
as well as provide an analysis of Russia and how the U.S. must approach this 
long-time adversary. 
I.  THE IRON CURTAIN 
At the beginning of the Cold War, which lasted from 1945 to 1991, 
Winston Churchill explained how the “Iron Curtain” hungered for power 
through an expansion of its control in the region.  On March 5, 1946 in a 
speech titled The Sinews of Peace, which he delivered at Westminster 
College in Fulton, Missouri, Churchill said: 
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain 
has descended across the Continent.  Behind that line lie all the 
capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe.  
Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest 
and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them 
lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one 
form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, 
in some cases, increasing measure of control from—from 
Moscow . . . .  I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war.  What 
they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their 
power and doctrines.1
 
* Matthew Saha (M.P.P. 2010) received his B.A. in Journalism from the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill.  At Pepperdine University School of Public Policy he specialized in 
International Relations and Economics. 
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After World War II, the U.S. finally found itself standing the tallest 
among other global powers.  The Soviet Union found itself as the second 
world power and it looked to limit the U.S.’s ability to achieve additional 
progress and separate itself further from the Soviets.  For instance, Stalin 
“sought to deter the U.S. from utilizing its military strength.  He did this by 
capitalizing on the Soviet lead in conventional arms and exploiting the 
perception that Western Europe was vulnerable to an attack by the Red 
Army.2
Stalin’s policies helped turn the Soviet Union into an industrial and 
military superpower, but ultimately wreaked havoc domestically with a high 
level of human suffering.3  When Nikita Khrushchev took over after Stalin’s 
death, Khrushchev guided the Soviet Union in a different direction by 
“persuading the other members of the socialist camp to adopt a ‘new course’ 
that relaxed the harsher features of the Stalinist system [and] sought to 
improve relations in other areas of conflict as well.”4  While Khrushchev led 
the Soviet Union, he struck fear in the U.S. with the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
and he approved the construction of the Berlin Wall.  Additionally, 
Khrushchev’s leadership played a key role in opening up the Third World to 
Russia.  Khrushchev saw the third world “as an arena in which the Soviets 
could compete with the West with high likelihood of success, but with less 
risk than would result from a direct challenge in the ‘main arena’ of the 
bipolar struggle.”5  This entry into other states in the region allowed for 
increased trade and influence.  Eventually, Khrushchev “voluntarily” retired 
from office and Leonid Brezhnev assumed control before Mikhail 
Gorbachev became the last General Secretary of the Communist Party.6  
“During the Brezhnev years, people had been constantly bombarded with the 
claim that ‘life is improving,’ even while they were surrounded with 
abundant evidence that the country was falling apart.”7  The Soviet Union 
was set to implode, due in part to the nuclear arms race with the U.S., 
NATO’s policy of containment, and the USSR’s own economic failings that 
were crippling it internally and making life miserable for its citizens. 
The Berlin Wall had become a symbol of the USSR’s oppression and its 
socialist regime that fought hard to not only keep intruders out, but keep its 
own citizens within the walls of the Soviet Union.  The Berlin Wall came to 
represent the relationship between the U.S. and the USSR: dividing two 
cultures, and two philosophies, while buttressed by guard towers with 
soldiers who would fire upon anyone who dared come too close.  The U.S.’s 
foreign policy of containment and deterrence would soon change. 
II.  11/9 
In his book The World is Flat, Thomas Friedman argued that while 9/11 
was the day the U.S. woke up and realized how interconnected and small the 
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world had become, this shift began more than a decade earlier with the fall 
of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989.  Friedman argues that the fall of 
the Berlin Wall “tipped the balance of power across the world toward those 
advocating democratic, consensual, free-market-oriented governance, and 
away from those advocating authoritarian rule with centrally planned 
economies.”8
Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader that transitioned Russia from the 
grips of the Cold War to a new type of governance and “significantly altered 
the foreign policy of the USSR, in part as a response to . . . .changes in the 
international environment.”9  Gorbachev’s role after the Cold War was just 
as important because the U.S. and Russia relationship “came in from the 
cold [and t]he two rivals became partners.”10
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia was not expected to play as 
significant of a role on the global stage as they previously had because the 
world was no longer bipolar and the U.S. stood alone as the world’s only 
superpower.  The U.S. did not expect future challenges or threats from the 
Russians, at least, not for some time.  When the Soviet Union fell, the U.S. 
and its leaders were short-sighted to think that Russian leaders would not try 
to challenge the U.S. once more. 
After Gorbachev’s failings domestically, Boris Yeltsin became the first 
president of the Russian Federation.  Author Lilia Shevtsova noted that, 
In foreign policy, Yeltsin continued Gorbachev’s withdrawal from 
confrontation with the West, but where Gorbachev had broken the 
mold of international relations, compelling the West also to seek 
new policies and think in new terms, Yeltsin not only failed to find 
a new global role for Russia, but also failed to understand new 
international realities.11
Boris Yeltsin’s self-appointed replacement, Vladimir Putin, significantly 
changed how the U.S. dealt with Russia.  While there was neither a Cuban 
missile crisis, nor a nuclear arms race, the security implications changed as 
Russia’s new leader became less friendly to the West than his predecessors.  
Putin changed the face of the presidency both domestically and 
internationally.  The former Russian intelligence agent travelled 
internationally more than two dozen times in his first year as president, and a 
large portion of the countries he visited were former Soviet states.12
Part of Putin’s strategy was to counter what Russians considered U.S. 
hegemony by forging new relationships through his travels and creating 
strategic partnerships.  Putin was the first Russian leader to visit North 
Korea in nearly fifty years, and he also visited Fidel Castro in late 2000.13  
Putin’s meetings with leaders of countries who are sworn enemies of the 
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U.S. should have been an indication that Russia was untrustworthy.  
However, after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, Putin 
was the first to contact President George W. Bush to offer support.14  By 
supporting the U.S., “Russia hoped to gain some of the benefits that are 
shared between allies.  But there was a deeper motivation.  Russia had for 
years viewed itself as engaged in its own war against Islamic extremism and 
thus found in the Bush administration a natural and powerful ally against a 
common enemy.15
It was acceptable for the U.S. to engage Russia when the benefits were 
obvious for the U.S.  Russia cooperated with the U.S. after 9/11 by sharing 
intelligence information, and allowing the U.S. to enter Russian fly zones.16  
This cooperation was short-lived in part due to the Russian’s opposition to 
the Iraq War.17
The fraying of the relationship between the U.S. and Russia continued 
as Russia developed relationships with countries such as Iran, and nuclear 
proliferation became a prominent issue.  The U.S. Russian relationship 
became increasingly strained with Russia’s agreement to build nuclear plants 
in Iran starting in 2010, and Iran arguing it needed “[twenty] uranium 
enrichment plants to produce enough fuel for its nuclear power plants.”18  It 
is clear that Russia benefits, as long as it receives backing on the 
international stage to create a balancing effect.  “[Russia] is not interested in 
a nuclear-armed Iran on its southern doorstep.  Nor does Russia want to see 
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East . . .[However,] an agreement [to 
produce nuclear reactors] would be a boon to Russia’s image as a peace 
broker in international politics . . .Russia also has strong economic interests 
in Iran.”19
It is clear that Russia acts in its own self-interest, and the U.S. should 
use Russia’s history and actions as a road map to predict Russia’s future 
endeavors and potential indiscretions.  If the opportunity to work with 
Russia presents itself, the U.S. should consider the partnership for any 
benefits that can be provided or goals that can be accomplished.  However, 
just as in politics, foreign policy can make for strange bedfellows.  While 
Russia has not always found itself in the good graces of the U.S., the two 
countries were able to work together when fighting Hitler’s Nazi Germany 
and Islamic terrorists.  The important lesson that must be learned is that 
Russia has no desire to reside on the sidelines, and because of this, Russia 
should remain a large part of the U.S.’s equation when developing a national 
security strategy. 
III.  TODAY’S RUSSIA 
Because Vladimir Putin handpicked his successor, Dmitry Medvedev, it 
is difficult to assess whether Medvedev is acting independently as 
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President.20  As Prime Minister of Russia, a title Putin also held while 
serving as President, Putin remains visible in government affairs both 
domestically and internationally.  While the transformation in Russia is 
obvious, questions still remain on what to make of its current leaders and in 
what direction they are guiding their country.  While it appears that 
Medvedev and Putin are insistent that Russia returns to some semblance of 
relevance, it remains unclear how they expect to accomplish this goal, or 
more specifically, how much relevance they seek.  Furthermore, while 
Russia may not be the next direct successor to the U.S. as the world’s 
superpower, it is important to remember that Russia remains a member of 
the nuclear community and can create its own deterrence on the U.S. or 
other countries, as necessary.21  In addition, “Russia has one of the largest 
energy reserves and is one of the largest energy producers.”22
While the U.S. remains the hegemonic leader in the world today, it is 
clear that Russia seeks to balance out the U.S. through the United Nations 
and partnerships with countries that fail to see the U.S. as an ally.  Krastev 
elaborated on the progression in Russia by saying, Russia also: 
“decided not to cooperate with the West in taming Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions or in settling the final status of Kosovo [and t]he 
country’s military budget has increased six fold since 2000.23
Additionally, Putin’s trip to Venezuela in April 2010, which could result 
in Hugo Chavez possessing nuclear capabilities, is troubling.24  Whether 
Russia is flexing its military might, or expanding its influence, the U.S. 
cannot ignore these developments and must carefully consider its approach.  
Because of the countries that Russia has continued to align with, it would be 
best for the U.S. to consider its national security strategy towards Russia 
through the eye of realist theory. 
IV.  REALIST THEORY AND RUSSIA 
According to Kenneth Waltz’s Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory, 
realist theory tells us that man desires power, and he will fight for it among 
others who seek the same power.25The vision of an anarchic world where 
states constantly compete with one another must be accepted by those who 
devise a national strategy for the U.S.  Any analysis must consider Russia’s 
history to accurately understand its tendencies.  While Russia might not 
challenge the U.S. in the way it did during the Cold War, it now uses alternative 
avenues, such as balancing to expand its influence, either directly, or in 
conjunction with other countries. 
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The competition for scarce goods is reflected in the limited natural 
resources available in the world, and the degree to which states are able to 
maintain their advantage of access to these resources.  The resources are 
being sought by countries with growing economies and populations, such as 
China, but also by the U.S., which consumes more oil than any other country 
in the world.26  If history teaches the U.S. anything, policymakers will 
correctly assess that Russia will succeed in its quest to achieve more power 
and influence in its own region and around the world.  Having once been a 
superpower, it should be understood that Russia is unlikely to accept 
anything less than a return to its past glory. 
V.  RUSSIA AND CHINA 
While Russia’s relations with countries such as Iran, North Korea and 
Cuba draw the ire of the U.S., China is perhaps the most intriguing and 
important ally for Russia.  Russia has aligned itself with China in an effort to 
position itself more favorably than if it took an isolationist approach to 
foreign policy.  Russia and China have a very storied past, which is reflected 
in several treaties and alliances during and since the Cold War.  The Sino-
Soviet alliance, which was formed during the early years of the Cold War, 
but the alliance eventually turned to conflict due to treaties that China 
claimed were forced onto them by the Soviets,27 And “By [1969], each party 
clearly regarded each other—and no longer the U.S.—as its primary security 
threat.”28
Today, Russia and China have once again become evolved partners, and 
their relationship must be seriously considered when devising a national 
security plan.  On July 15, 2001, the presidents of Russia and China signed a 
Treaty for Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation in Moscow, 
which covered five areas of cooperation including: “Joint actions to offset a 
perceived U.S. hegemonism; demarcation of the two countries’ long-
disputed 4,300 km border; arms sales and technology transfers; energy and 
raw materials supply; and the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia.”29  
While many analysts said there was no reason to panic that these two 
countries were working together, there was “growing concern that the new 
treaty between Moscow and Beijing [could] increase coordination between 
the two countries against the U.S.”30
In 2010, Russia is still using China to balance against the U.S. and while 
neither could beat the U.S. militarily, there are efforts to siphon away the 
U.S.’s economic power.  As reported in numerous news outlets, China and 
Russia have both voiced their intentions of moving away from the U.S. 
dollar and creating a new global currency.31
In addition to its alliance with China, Russia has teamed with Gulf 
Arabs, Japan, and France to end dollar dealings for oil due to the precipitous 
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drop in the U.S. currency.  These countries want to move instead to a basket 
of currencies.32  This move presents a dangerous threat to the U.S.  With the 
dwindling value of the U.S. dollar, the move could seriously impact the U.S. 
economy even further if oil is no longer able to be purchased by the U.S. in 
its own currency.  If these states move away from accepting the dollar for oil 
and instead use a combination of currencies in a “basket,” the power could 
shift swiftly from West to East.  Russia’s motive for its relationship with 
China is not only to act as a balance against the U.S., but also to enable 
China’s growth by providing natural resources, such as oil.33
Furthermore, China’s role as the number one foreign holder of U.S. debt 
provides Russia with more leverage.  The power and large swath of the 
globe that the two countries control can continue to grow, particularly if the 
U.S. economy continues to falter, or the government continues to debase its 
own currency by printing more money. 
The U.S. is likely to feel additional pain from the economic downturn.  
It is unlikely that politicians and bureaucrats will stop the printing presses 
that are increasing the amount of debt owed by the U.S. because 
domestically that would mean political suicide for the politicians, and further 
blame would be placed on the bureaucrats.  It is more likely that the U.S. 
will keep interest rates low and print additional dollars, and when the 
international community sees this continuing they will cry foul.  If countries 
such as Russia and China team up together and lead a charge to change the 
currency that is used for foreign oil, which the U.S. is dependent on, it will 
significantly hurt the U.S.  Unfortunately, the U.S. has itself backed into a 
corner politically, and is likely to have to deal with international decisions 
before making internal adjustments. 
Russia’s relationship with China convolutes the U.S.’s diplomatic 
measures.  Instead of dealing with only Russia, the U.S. must also consider 
China in every equation.  In addition to China and Russia’s economic 
relationship, China’s growth and Russia’s energy policy could greatly affect 
the U.S., particularly if the U.S. is forced to deal with an energy crisis like it 
did in 1973 and 1979.  Granted, with the history that China and Russia have, 
it is not implausible to think their relationship could disintegrate to the 
advantage of the U.S. 
VI.  ENERGY AS A NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE 
The U.S. is the number one consumer of oil in the world, followed by 
China, which consumes less than half as much oil as the U.S.34  Since 1973, 
there have been three instances where the U.S. has dealt with an energy 
crunch that has hurt the U.S. economy.  The first energy crunch occurred in 
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1973, when members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) enacted an oil embargo on the U.S. because of the U.S.’s 
involvement with Israel during the Yom Kippur War.35  This embargo was 
followed six years later with a decrease in oil production due to the Iranian 
Revolution, which brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power.36
President Jimmy Carter addressed the U.S.’s national interests in the 
Persian Gulf, in what later became known as the Carter Doctrine, and stated 
that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf 
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S. of 
America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, 
including military force.”37  With the Soviet Union’s invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent rise in gasoline prices, the U.S. saw 
oil as a critical national security issue38
The third energy crisis the U.S. faced was during the summer of 2008 
when oil hit $147.30 per barrel.39  Already facing a slowing economy, U.S. 
consumers changed both their consuming and driving habits, just as they did 
during the 1970s.40  This prolonged the pain faced by an economy that had 
yet to see the collapse in the credit and financial markets.  According to 
some scholars, such as Michael Klare, the Carter Doctrine is primarily 
responsible for the U.S.’s venture into the Middle East and involvement in 
three major wars, including the current military involvement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.41These scholars fail to address how the U.S. would function as 
a society if countries such as Russia had moved into the Middle East and 
taken over oil reserves.  Furthermore, while the rationale for foreign 
entanglements is debatable, the fact is that the U.S. needs oil and energy to 
function as a country.  While efforts have been made to wean the U.S. off of 
a foreign energy supply through increased domestic production and 
alternatives that can be made in the U.S., foreign oil cannot be easily 
replaced. 
The U.S’s addiction to oil is important to Russia because it is the 
eleventh largest exporter of oil to the U.S.42  Additionally, allies of the U.S., 
such as Western Europe and other countries in the European Union, rely on 
natural gas that is delivered through Russian owned pipelines.  If Russia 
chooses to cut off natural gas supplies, it will greatly affect Europe, so it is a 
critical to ensure that Russia does not withhold natural resources from 
European countries that rely on them. 
Because of the scarcity and abundance of oil in certain parts of the 
world, it is easy to see how oil can be a security risk for the U.S.  With its 
dependence on foreign countries for its energy supply, the U.S. should 
continue to keep the Carter Doctrine as part of its national security strategy.  
The U.S. would cease to operate effectively without oil being imported from 
the Middle East and other countries, such as Venezuela, that Russia may be 
able to influence into cutting off supplies to the U.S.  While avoiding 
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resource wars is ideal, realist theory continues to be the best way for a 
country to protect itself against adverse actions by other countries.  
Considering the steps that Russia has already taken against the U.S. dollar, a 
decision not to use the U.S. dollar when buying and selling oil could be 
crippling.  Both of these decisions by Russia should be considered attempts 
to sidestep the military power of the U.S., and to cripple its capabilities as a 
world power. 
VII.  WHAT RUSSIA WANTS 
The U.S. is not without blame for the deterioration of the U.S.–Russia 
relationship.  NATO was created to balance and isolate the Soviet Union 
after World War II, and to put U.S. military bases in countries surrounding 
Russia and Russia’s allies.  From Russia’s perspective, the U.S. appears 
expansionary when it builds a coalition with countries in Eastern Europe that 
used to be inside Russia’s borders.  From a Hobbesian point of view, Russia 
considers the U.S. a threat to its own autonomy, and Russia will do whatever 
it can to fight against any further losses. 
Even though President Medvedev is currently in power, some suggest 
that Prime Minister Putin is either waiting in the wings and expects to return 
to power, or he is really running the show behind the scenes.43  However, 
when Medvedev gave his second state of the nation address, he surprised 
most critics by calling for broad policy changes, saying Russia needed to rid 
itself of government corruption, reform the election system, allow for 
innovation in the financial sector, and actively look for investment of capital 
from outside of Russia.44
Before this speech, Medvedev had faced the confrontation with George, 
a back-slipping Russian economy, and an incident where the Russian natural 
gas pipeline company, Gazprom, cutoff several European countries from 
their natural gas supplies.  These actions left most thinking that Putin is still 
controlling Russia.45  If Medvedev can follow through with some of his 
proposals, Russia may assist the U.S. in future endeavors. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Krastev called Russia a “rising global power, but also a declining 
state.”46  He elaborated by saying: 
In [ten] years’ time, Russia will not be a failed state.  But neither 
will it be a mature democracy.  Russian foreign policy will remain 
independent—one that promotes Russia’s great-power status in a 
multipolar world.  It will be selectively confrontational.  Russia will 
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remain more integrated in the world than it has ever been in its 
history, and it will remain as suspicious as ever.47
If Krastev is right about what the U.S. can expect from Russia, then 
little good can be expected from a relationship as Russia will only continue 
to align with countries that find themselves pitted against the U.S.  Likewise, 
the U.S. should be expected to align with NATO and other Eastern European 
countries, against Russia.  Currently, the U.S. is unlikely to do much to deter 
Russia due to its weakened economic state and Russia’s tactical alliance 
with China.  As the U.S.’s biggest trading partner, and the largest holder of 
U.S. debt, China could prove to be more dangerous than Russia.  With 
regard to Russia, the U.S. must continue to be diplomatic and encourage the 
changes that President Medvedev called for during his address to the 
General Assembly.  If the domestic changes fail to take place, the U.S. 
should consider that the failure is due to Putin’s ability to influence 
Medvedev, or as further proof that Medvedev is not running the country.  
Putin’s actions will speak louder than Medvedev’s words if domestic reform 
fails and Russia’s partnerships deepen with countries such as Iran, 
Venezuela, and China. 
This paper has touched on the leadership, military, economic, and 
energy-related issues concerning U.S.-Russian relations since World War II.  
Russia is a very complex country which the U.S. should engage, while 
keeping realist theory in mind because Russia has proven itself to be 
unpredictable, particularly since the fall of Soviet Russia.  Krastev, who has 
lower expectations for today’s version of the once-superpower said, 
Russia is not simply a revisionist power-it is something potentially 
more dangerous: a spoiler at large.  The Kremlin’s recent actions 
easily fit this threatening image.  In reality, though, Russia is not a 
spoiler so much as it likes to be viewed as one.  Where the West 
seeks to find aggressiveness and imperial tendencies, it will find 
uncertainty and vulnerability.48
Krastev could be correct in his assessment, but Russia was overwhelmed 
with uncertainty and vulnerability in 1991 and today, it is back at the 
forefront of the international conversation.  While Russia is not currently 
vying for supremacy, expecting Russia to remain weak should not be a long-
term assumption.  In fact, Medvedev and Putin are sure to challenge any 
such notion, and the U.S. must be ready to respond. 
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